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Direct Action Against the Liability Insuror
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure
BY DON W. MARSHALL*
Since the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a favorite sub-
ject of conjecture among the members of the bar has been whether, under
the liberalized procedure of the rules, the liability insurance company
can be joined along with its insured as a defendant when the insured is
sued in a negligence action. Such joinder has now been made, attacked
by motions to dismiss and to drop a party, and sustained in the Denver
District Court.1
The provisions of the rules most salient to this subject are found
in 18 (b) and 20 (a). Rule 18 (b) provides in part, "Whenever a
claim is one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been
prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single
action." Rule 20 (a) provides in part, "All persons may be joined in one
action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or
in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences and
if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the
action."
Without question the injured party must at some stage have a claim
against the insured. This is usually created by a policy provision that
the injured party shall have a right of action against the insuror after
final judgment is obtained against the insured. In some jurisdictions,
the right is given by the substantive law; indeed, in some jurisdictions
by "direct action" statutes, the insuror may be sued as a party primarily
liable. Obviously, however, the decisions from jurisdictions having
"direct action" statutes, as well as decisions from those jurisdictions
wherein a statutory substantive right not to be sued is given to the in-
suror, contribute nothing to the determination of this question in Colo-
rado (and in most other jurisdictions) where no statutory right of or
against the insuror exists.
Within the literal meaning of the rule, the claim against the insuror
is "one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been prose-
cuted to a conclusion." The language employed is free from ambiguity.
A principal objection to according the language its literal meaning,
and the same objection which in nearly every case in the past has alone
sufficed to prevent the open mention of insurance in the pleadings and
during trial, is that knowledge of the jury of the existence of insurance
*Of the Denver bar.
'Reynolds vs. Epiphany, etc., No. A-41621. Decided October 15, 1945.
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would create a- danger of prejudice. The very efficacy of this contention
practically made unnecessary and prevented the consideration of others,
which until now have found exercise almost entirely in speculative dis-
cussions. But to answer this argument, it would appear highly ques-
tionable, if joinder were permissable for any affirmative reason, to deny
the privilege on the excuse of danger of prejudice.
Just as in many other situations, matter objectionable on one
ground may be injected, nonetheless, if admissible on another ground.
Indeed, illustration may be found in this very field in the permissive
questioning on voire dire as to the interest of veniremen in the insurance
business. 2 Such being true, little difficulty should be encountered in
subordinating the qualified right to protection from a mere possibility of
prejudice to the clearly given right of joinder under the rules.
Other principal arguments now being raised against joinder are:
(a) under the terms of the contract, the injured party has no right of
action against the insuror until after final judgment obtained against the
insured, (b) the insuror would be put to the trouble and expense of
defending needlessly in the event that judgment was given for the insured
and against the injured person, and (c) misjoinder of tort and contract
actions.
In answer to the first of these contentions, it may be pointed out
that the substantive liability of the parties is not affected. Just as for-
merly, if no judgment is obtained against the insured, no liability results
to the insuror. The joinder merely accomplishes in one proceeding that
which formerly required two. The rule itself furnishes protection against
transgression of substantive rights, contract or otherwise, by its provi-
sion that "the court shall grant relief only in accordance with the relative
substantive rights of the parties."
The argument based upon needless expense and trouble to the
insuror will in nearly every case be found to be non-existent since, under
the policy terms, the insuror will be defending the action on behalf of the
insured, and usually with its own attorneys.
Aside from this, when a choice becomes necessary between consoli-
dation and expedition on the one hand, and conservative procedural safe-
guards on the other, the preference of the rules for the former is never in
doubt. Can the insurance company assert that its risk of making a need-
less defense is any more than the grantee's in the situation alluded to by
rule 18 (b), namely, "A plaintiff may state a claim for money and a
claim to have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first
having obtained judgment establishing the claim for money"? Or can it
claim that it is more subject to the risk than is the third party defendant,
'Rains vs. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, inter alia.
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joined under rule 14, whose liability will not arise unless and until the
primary defendant's liability to the plaintiff is established? It would
seem very doubtful.
The misjoinder of actions contention finds its answer in rules 20
(a) and 18 (a) so plainly as to require no elaboration.
In the Denver District Court case alluded to above, plaintiff was
required to meet the contention, strenuously urged, that the policy,
which created plaintiff's right against the insuror, also prohibited the
joinder which plaintiff sought to make. These provisions, more or less
standard, read as follows: "No action shall lie against the Company
unless, as a condition precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully com-
plied with all the terms of this policy, nor until the amount of Insured's
obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by judgment
against the Insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the
Insured, the claimant, and the Company," and, "Nothing contained in
this policy shall give any person or organization any right to join the
Company as a co-defendant in any action against Insured to determine
the Insured's liability." The essence of this argument was that if the
injured party had any right against the insured, it was created by and
derived from the policy and therefore subject to, and governed by, the
above provisions found in the same instrument.
In reply to this argument it was pointed out that efforts to contract
against the processes of the law must fail. 3 While one may waive his
own rights in certain instances, one may not by contract deprive the
courts of their right to employ their duly adopted procedure for the
determination of a liability. In short, one cannot at will contract away
the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ultimate determination of the question, of course, remains for the
Colorado Supreme Court. So far"as the reported decisions, both state
and federal, reveal, the decision by the Denver District Court may well
be the first in the country of this precise question.
'Walters vs. Eagle Indemnity, 61 S. W. (2d) 666; The Thomas P. Beal, 298
Fed. 121; Otis Co. vs. Maryland Cos. Co., 95 Colo. 99.
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